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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE EFFECTS OF HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS ON RESTAURANT
THRESHOLD PRICE

This study examines the determinants of a household’s threshold price for a restaurant
meal cost increase; the level of cost increase that would cause households to either eat in
restaurants less frequently or change what they would typically purchase. The design of
the study is formulated using a Tobit model to examine the threshold price by differing
social, economic and demographic characteristics of households in Kentucky as well as
their preferences for restaurant-specific characteristics.
The empirical estimates suggest that households that frequently have dinner at
restaurants, households with higher incomes and households that strongly prefer fullservice restaurants have a positive threshold price-range; which suggests that such
households are more willing to pay an additional cost increase in restaurant meals.
Conversely, households that always notice taxes before paying their checks, households
close to retirement-age, and households that do not strongly prefer local-food restaurants
have negative threshold price-range and are consequently less willing to pay an additional
cost increase in restaurant meals.

KEYWORDS: Food-away-from-home, Restaurant Tax, Socio-demographics, Threshold
price, Tobit Analysis.
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Introduction
Taxing tourism is a cogent alternative for governments facing budgetary constraints and
pressures to minimize reliance on a variety of taxes since tourism taxes can correct for
market failure while generating revenue (Gooroochurn & Sinclair 2005). Tourism taxes
are generally levied on any establishment engaged in the business of providing
recreational services, food and/ or lodging to transient guests with the aim or revitalizing
the tourism infrastructure of a city or state. Not all restaurants are engaged in tourism,
though restaurant taxes may form a relative proportion of tourism tax.
The debate about restaurant taxes in particular is complex, and prior studies have shed
light on only some of the relevant issues. Restaurant taxes affect both the distribution of
income among residents of a city or state as well as between locals and tourists. Like
most cases, if not set at optimal welfare maximizing levels, restaurant and food taxes can
be inefficient and inequitable. It is largely suggestive in the literature that taxes should
comply with the principles of equity and efficiency, with the ability-to-pay principle
positing that each individual should contribute in line with his/her ability to pay
(Mustgrave 1959; Gooroochurn 2003; Gooroochurn & Sinclair 2005). However, some
studies have found some variations of food taxes to be regressive (Drewnowski and
Darmon, 2005; Leicester and Windmeijer, 2004; Smed, Jenson and Denver, 2007).
For the principles of equity and efficiency to hold in restaurant taxation, households with
a higher ability to pay are expected to contribute more than households with a lower
ability to pay. Regardless, lower income households may be contributing more as a
1

percentage of their incomes to the tax revenue generated than higher income households.
Moreover, the income group with the largest demand may well be tendering the most to
the accrued restaurant tax revenue. This follows from economic theory which suggests
that the greater the proportion of demand by an income segment in total demand, the
higher their contribution to the total restaurant tax revenue generated. Thus the income
group with the greatest concentration within a region would invariably register the lion’s
share of tax revenue generated.
The questions of the optimal size of the tax and the specific foods on which it should be
levied (e.g. some or all restaurant meals, high fat-, high sugar- and salt-content meals,
high-calorific desserts and/or carbonated beverages) remain a source of debate
(Finkelstein et al., 2010). Economic theory stipulates that an increase in the unit price of a
normal good could effectively induce a change in the consumption pattern of the agent; a
reduction in the consumption of the good. Thus we would expect that an increase in the
tax/price of restaurant meals would culminate in a decrease in demand of restaurant
meals. However, the households’ oblivion or awareness of the existence or adoption of an
additional levied tax may cause them to demand the same quantity or even more
especially if the additional tax is discretionary and relatively minute.
Jacobson and Brownwell (2000) observe mixed opinions in the literature about the
feasibility of a steep tax and thus suggest that even small taxes on widely consumed
foods can generate substantial revenue. Similarly, Andreyeva et al. (2010) suggest that
the power of small taxes/price changes applied to broad-based widely consumed foods
and foods most responsive to price changes (e.g. restaurant meals) have effects that
accumulate across a population and thus can also raise substantial revenues. The results
2

of the said authors indicate that small taxes could reduce consumption by a considerable
amount. On the other hand Finkelstein, Zhen, Nonnemaker and Todd (2010) explore
large (20% and 40%) tax increases and yet find modest effects on foods expenditures;
less than $30 per households per year on average. Finkelstein et al. suggest that large
taxes have more potential to influence consumption outcomes especially for middleincome households and could also generate higher revenues.
A number of studies have provided estimates price elasticity of demand for different
types of FAFH (Richards and Mancino, 2011) while others have examined the effects of
taxes on food consumption habits and outcomes (Cast et al., 2005, Powell et al., 2009).
The underlying objective of this study is to examine the threshold-price (TP); the %
increase in cost of restaurant meals that would cause consumers to alter their
purchasing/expenditure behavior. With the aid of survey data, the study examines
percentage increases in cost of meals that would cause different socio-demographic
households to either eat in restaurants less frequently or change what they typically
purchase in restaurants.

Background Study on Restaurant Meal Tax

Restaurant Food Expenditure P atterns
The literature indicates that price is a significant determinant of food choices and
restaurant choice and frequency. Data from experimental studies show that, second only
to taste, food price is one of the most influential factors in determining food choice
(Glanz et al., 1998, French, 2003) thus food price manipulations are increasingly being
3

considered as economic strategies and incentives for influencing food choices that
consumers make (Popkin, Duffey and Gordon-Larsen, 2011; Powell, 2009). Persons
facing stricter economic constraints will preferentially select lower-cost energy-dense
diets rather than abandon their usual eating habits, thus strategies for influencing meal
choice ought to take food preferences and the usual eating habits into account
(Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005).
Data from the USDA Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals show that 56%
of US adults report eating away from home on any given day; of these, about 33% ate at
a fast food outlet. The number of restaurants and eating establishments has more than
tripled over the past couple of decades with a continued increase in demand for them and
a simultaneous downward trend in per capita expenditures for food at home (FAH) as a
portion of per capita personal consumption expenditures (McCracken and Brandt, 1987).
In the early 1970s, about 20% of the household food dollar was spent on food away from
home. By 1995, an estimated 40% of the US household food dollar was spent on food
away from home (Putnam and Allshouse, 1996). The proportion of expenditures spent on
food-away-from-home (FAFH) has vastly increased, as the consumption of purchased
meals away from home has become more frequent relative to food consumed at home
(Lee and Brown, 1986).
Tax Targeting; At-Risk Populations
Socio-demographic data have the benefit of being accessible, less ambiguous, and less
expensive to gather; however, the variables are of limited value unless they are clearly
and explicitly related to important consumer behavioral attributes
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such as

expenditure/consumption behavior or demand, thus facilitating the decision and
implementation of specific economic and marketing strategies (Cai, 1998). The changes
in household composition and shifts in the population have been accompanied by
changing consumer spending behaviors (Jacobs & Shipp, 1990; Kotler, 1995).
Rising food prices cause low-income consumers to change their demand far more than
high-income consumers (Jones, 1997). The average American spends less than $8.00/d
on food and beverages, with low-income families spending as little as $25 per person per
week (Putnam et al., 2002). Opponents of targeted tax are often concerned about the
extent to which the tax disproportionately affects lower-income households (Finkelstein
et al, 2010). There are mixed opinions on the feasibility and desirability of a steep tax
whereas a small tax may be more feasible and still could generate significant revenues for
“quality of life expenditures” that support tourism, recreation and economic development.
The proportion of a household budget allocated to all food tends to decline with
increasing income. Thus taxes on food and food items may be regressive since they have
a higher impact on low-income households than the affluent. In a related study, the very
poorest 2% of the population were found to spend seven times more of their total income
on a food tax than the rich; the middle class would pay around 0.25% (a quarter) of their
total income on the food tax; while the richest would pay less than 0.1% of their income
on the food tax (Liecester and Windmeijer, 2004). This is however the case for UK and
might be subtly different for the US. All in all tax and price increases have a more subtle
effect on the purchasing behavior of the wealthier and most educated than on other sociodemographic groups (Smed et al., 2007).

5

Proposed Uses of Restaurant Tax
Restaurant taxes have been considered as a strategy for generating substantial revenue as
well as promoting tourism. The actual implementation of any tax requires specific criteria
as one cannot simply instruct retailers and restaurateurs to tax the least purchased food
items while excluding the more highly demanded foods and vice versa (Cash and
Lacanilao, 2007). Thus specific guidelines as to what categories of food will be included
and which will not be affected must be developed (Cash et al., 2007).
The sales tax for most jurisdictions goes into a general fund. In some cases however, the
sales or other specifically applied food tax revenues are apportioned for diverse special
projects. Rhode Island initially earmarked a portion of its sales tax revenue for
environmental management and litter control; Virginia uses a portion of its sales tax and
other specifically applied food taxes for litter control and recycling distributors based on
total sales of fund; West Virginia uses its soft-drink-tax revenues to support its medical,
dental, and nursing schools; Tennessee uses a portion of its special-food-tax revenues to
help clean up highways; while Washington pursues violence prevention and drug
enforcement with its soft-drinks tax (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000).
In the state of Kentucky specifically, where this research is focused on, the KY League of
Cities (KLC) suggests that for any allowable jurisdiction imposing a restaurant tax, the
money set aside for tourism promotion will lead to more visitations and therefore more
revenue for businesses. The bill recommends that up to 75% of the tax may be used for
quality of life expenditures that support tourism, recreation, and economic development
with a minimum of 25% going to the local tourist and convention commissions.

6

Current State & Local Restaurant Taxes
Kentucky’s cities are divided into six classes based on their population. Enacted
legislation in July 1992, KRS 91A.400, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky allowed 4th
and 5th class cities to levy a tax on restaurant meal purchases with all funds authorized to
be turned over to the tourist & convention commission in the city. The tax levied was not
to exceed 3% of retail sales of restaurants operating with the cities’ jurisdiction. The tax
levied on 4th and 5th cities affected 54% of the cities in Kentucky. For that matter the tax
did not affect the largest 8% of Kentucky’s cities which are classified as 1st and 2nd class
cities. Thus cities like Louisville and Lexington, which are 1st and 2nd class cities
respectively, did not fall within the tax net of the legislation.
In recent years however, the State Legislature has proposed an amendment to KRS
91A.400 to extend the restaurant tax reach not only to 4th and 5th class cities but all cities
in Kentucky irrespective of its size. The Bill would allow all cities, urban-county
governments, consolidated local governments, unified local governments, and charter
county governments to charge a restaurant tax. A tax of up to 3% would be imposed on
the meals people eat in a restaurant or the carryout orders people pick up, on top of the
6% current state sales tax. The proposal is part of the Kentucky League of Cities 2014
Legislative Agenda as a way to get additional revenue for cities (Kentucky Legislature,
2014).
The proposed restaurant tax is gaining momentum in the state legislature, but the bill has
yet to be pre-filed. Kentucky Restaurant Association is opposed to the plan and believes
consumers should be as well, since most local restaurant owners are most likely to pass
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that cost on to their consumers. According to one restaurant owner “the bottom line is
that the 3 percent is going to affect each family another $150 a year, and again, change
some people's decisions to go out and eat" (WDRB News, 2014).
Summary
Research on the effect of taxes on restaurant food choices have raised a number of
questions - including the optimal size of the tax and the level of tax that alters food
choice and food expenditure behavior - which have not thoroughly been addressed. The
emphasis of this study is on analyzing and estimating the effects of restaurant cost
increases on restaurant meal choice and frequency among households in Kentucky while
controlling for the different socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant preferences
of the households. The understanding and assessment of the tax effects on consumer
behavior is both critical and relevant for local and state government bodies, independent
restaurants,

chain

restaurants,

restaurant

representative

bodies

and

tourism

services/industry in making and implementing important legislative and strategic
business/marketing decisions for all stakeholders at hand.
The study is organized into the following chapters. Chapter 2 addresses the motivation,
objective and problem statement of the study; Chapter 3 focuses on a review of the
literature; Chapter 4 draws out a conceptual model of the study; Chapter 5 looks at the
data and methodology used in the study; Chapter 6 breaks down the results and findings
of the study; and Chapter 7 gives a discussion on the overview of the implications of the
study and makes suggestions on future research.

8

Problem Statement
Legislation has been proposed in Kentucky that would authorize city legislative bodies to
impose a tax on restaurant meals of no more than 3%, regardless of the size of the city.
The bill has gained attention and interest from Kentucky Travel Industry Association
(KTIA), the Kentucky Restaurant Association (KRA), and local tourism and restaurant
organizations and associations. The KRA believes restaurant demand is sensitive to
economic fluctuations - may cause significant falls in revenues as consumers react to
price increase - and thus oppose the tax. The KTIA is split on the matter while the
Kentucky League of Cities, an organization that represents the interests of city
governments, supports the tax. Extensive research has been published on the effects of
food price changes on demand for food and beverages yet substantial gaps exist in the
research base. To gain a comprehensive understanding of consumer food choice
behavior, the existing gaps as to the level of tax that elicits changes in the expenditure
and choice behaviors of households must be filled. Current data on the effects of income
distribution - with regards to assessments of differences in responsiveness to food prices
according to age, education, culture or ethnicity - are limited (Andreyeva et al. 2010).
The underlying purpose of this study is to examine how cost increases in restaurant meals
affect demand for food-away-from-home in Kentucky by socio-demographic
characteristics and restaurant preferences of the population.
Motivation and Objective
Food prices are already heavily affected, in much of the world by existing taxes, trade
restrictions, transportation policy, energy taxes, food assistance programs, environmental
9

policies and other interventions (Cash et al., 2007). Each consumer makes food choices
so as to maximize the direct utility associated with food consumption. Consumption takes
place until the marginal utility (reduced hunger, satisfaction or enjoyment) of one
additional unit of food is greater or equal to the marginal cost. The marginal utility,
although positive, diminishes as more food is consumed (Drewnowski et al., 2005).
Philipson et al. (2004) note that “individuals make food choices in the context of limited
time and income available in the presence of competing goods with the objective of
attaining multiple outcomes”, only one of which is satisfaction.
It is imperative to note that there is still no consensus on whether taxes have a true causal
effect on the choice of restaurants and the meals they offer. There is accumulating
evidence, contrary to the full optimization assumption, that suggests that agents are
inattentive to information and thus have delayed initial response (DellaVigna and Pollet
2009). Thus the main objective of the study is to tease out the price thresholds within
which different households would or would not change their purchasing and consumption
behavior at restaurants, following cost increases in restaurant meals.
Research Questions
In this study we focus solely on restaurant meals in our bid to forecast tax effects. The
research question seeks to analyze how restaurant taxes affect demand for food-awayfrom-home (FAFH) among different social, economic and demographic households in
Kentucky. To put the research questions in perspective I define threshold price as the
percentage increase in the cost of restaurant meals that would cause consumers to eat less
frequently at the restaurant or change what they would typically purchase.
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The sub-questions underlying the analysis of tax threshold price on socio-demographic
characteristics of households in Kentucky are as follows:
1: Is the threshold price of restaurant food more price/cost sensitive for low income
earners than for high income households and across consumers as a whole?
2: Are younger people more responsive to restaurant tax than older/retired (60+)
consumers?

(Do elderly households have lower economic status as determined by

income and expenditure- effects of the aging population on restaurant food purchases and
consumption?)
3: Are consumer households who notice all restaurant taxes charged more likely to have a
higher threshold price?
4: Is the preference for local foods independent of price/tax increases and the threshold
price of households?
In essence the research questions look at how four main socio-demographic and
restaurant characteristics - income, age, awareness of restaurant taxes and preference for
local foods - influence restaurant threshold price of households.

11

Review of the Literature
This literature review is organized into sections. The first section reviews empirical
evidence supporting the theories of tax/price increases in relation to socio-demographic
characteristics of households. The second section focuses on demand for food segmented
by income groups. The third section reviews restaurant expenditure patterns of senior
households. The fourth section explores price premiums for local foods and the fifth
section addresses the sensitivity of restaurant and meal choice to price/tax increases.
Observed links between price/tax, socioeconomic groups and restaurant
choice, and restaurant spending
The impact of price/tax instruments has generally been found to be stronger for lower
social classes than in other groups of the population (Smed et al., 2007). The literature
suggests that education increases the likelihood of FAFH decision (Ham et al., 1998) and
has a positive effect on expenditures on FAFH (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997; Ham et
al., 2003; 2004; Mihalopoulos & Demoussis, 2001; Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991).
Smed et al. (2007) find that younger age-groups decrease their demand for food on which
saturated fats are taxed than older age-groups. Although there is no clear evidence that
household size affects the of threshold price, previous studies have found household size
to contribute positively to the level of expenditure of FAFH (Hiemstra & Kim, 1995;
Nayga & Capps, 1992; Yen, 1993).
Based on the theories of consumer behavior and household production, Cai (1998)
applies a Tobit modeling procedure to investigate the relationship between vacation food
12

expenditures and household socio-demographic characteristics. He used a sample size of
3,176 observations obtained from the interview data of the 1992-1993 Consumer
Expenditure Survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). He found
that aside from residency, all the examined household characteristics contribute to the
explanation of vacation food expenditure. When the total marginal effects of the variables
were standardized and ranked it became clear that the change in food spending amount is
most affected by employment status, followed by education, seasonality, occupation,
ethnicity, housing tenure, marital status, age, presence of two or more earners, earned
income and unearned income. The number of children in the household had the least (and
negative) effect.
In a related study, Brown and Lee (1986) use a switching regression technique, for
examining food expenditures at and away from home. The authors use data from the
USDA’s Nationwide Food Consumption Survey for the statistical analysis. The estimated
income as a result of the probit model indicates that the higher a household’s income the
more likely they are to eat away from home. Their regional dummy indicates that
households located in suburban areas are more likely to eat away from home than those
in rural areas or central cities. Households with an employed female head, a more
educated female head, whites, the presence of males between 4-26 and females between
4-50 years old increase the likelihood that the household will eat away from home.
Using logit analysis, Nayga and Capps (1992) investigate the decision to eat FAFH, by
estimating a model in which the likelihood of eating away from home is a function of a
set of predetermined socioeconomic and demographic variables. Approximately 73% of
the individuals in their sample were correctly classified as either consuming or not
13

consuming FAFH using the logit specification. The authors found no statistical
significance between the likelihood that males or females eat FAFH. They also found
that individuals who are employed compared to the unemployed are more likely to eat
FAFH. On the other hand, blacks and Hispanics compared to whites, food-stamp
recipients, individuals on special diets and larger household are less likely to eat FAFH.
Their results show that the likelihood of consuming FAFH decreases with age but
increases with income. They also find that the probability of consuming FAFH is higher
on weekends than on weekdays.
French, Harnack and Jeffery (2000) examine demographic, behavioral and dietary
correlates of the frequency of fast food restaurant use in a community-based sample of
891 adult women. Their results showed that 21% of the sample reported eating three or
more fast food restaurant meals per week, with the frequency of fast food restaurant use
being higher among younger women, those with lower income, non-White ethnicity,
greater body weight, lower dietary restraint, fewer low-fat eating behaviors, and greater
television viewing. Over a three year intervention trial period, increases in frequency of
fast food restaurant use were associated with increases in body weight, total energy
intake, percentage fat intake and with decreases in physical activity, dietary restraint and
low-fat eating behaviors. However, the intake of several other foods, including fruits and
vegetables, did not differ by frequency of fast food restaurant use.
Gordon-Larsen, Guilkey, and Popkin (2011) use negative binomial regression models and
nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine how community-level food price
variation was associated with individual-level fast food intake by race/ethnicity and
income. They found relatively stronger statistical association between food prices and
14

fast food intake for males than females and significantly lower intake for non-whites
relative to whites. In particular, in the group with the strongest associations (black males),
a 20% increase in price of soda was associated with a decrease of a 0.25 visits to a fast
food restaurant per week. Furthermore, there was a relatively greater inverse change in
individual-level fast food intake with income, such that bigger changes in individual-level
fast food intake were seen at low income level, with greatest association in blacks. Thus
increases in community-level prices of fast food were associated with reductions in
individual-level fast food consumption and reduction of approximately one-quarter visits
to a fast food restaurant per week.
The analysis of the impact of food taxes on the quality of meals is studied by Smd et al.
(2007), who use price elasticities calculated from parameters estimated in econometric
demand system models of food demand for five social classes and seven age groups.
Weekly household panel data from Consumer-scan, spanning the period from January
1997 to December 2000 (approximately 2000 households) were used for the analysis.
The authors operate their tax instruments on two different levels; taxes/subsidies levied
directly on food commodities and taxes/subsidies that are levied on the nutrients
contained in foods are analyzed. The resulting change in demand for each sociodemographic group is then predicted from the price elasticities calculated from the fooddemand models. The results suggest that food demand choices are independent of prices
for the group with the highest income, while the lower social classes have the largest
demand/expenditure decreases in the advent of the imposed taxes. Also expenditure
decreases were mostly found in household below 50 years of age reflecting the
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willingness to adjust food demand in the short term for relatively younger households
compared to aging households.
Demand for food segmented by income
In the United States, where visible changes have occurred in income distribution,
commodity demand projections and tax strategies should be based on individual income
strata rather than on average estimates of price and income elasticities (Park et al., 1996).
Previous studies show that household income significantly and positively influences
FAFH participation and expenditure (Ham et al., 2003&2004; Hiemstra & Kim, 1995;
Jensen & Yen, 1996; Nayga & Capps, 1992; Nayga, 1996; Yen, 1993). Lower-income
households may respond differently to changes in price (tax) than higher-income
households, just as it is reasonable to expect different levels of subsistence expenditure
for groups segmented by income (Park, Holcomb, Raper & Capps, 1996).
Park et al (1996) use data from the 1987-88 Nationwide Consumption Survey (NFCS)
which provided detailed records on the money value, quality and type of foods purchased
by the household over a one-week period. They use 12 aggregate commodity groups
including FAFH as one of the commodity groups. Park et al. partitioned the data into two
income classes. The basis for their segmentation was the 1987-88 poverty guidelines
developed by the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and adapted
from poverty thresholds published by the Bureau of Census. Partitioning the data resulted
in the creation of a first poverty status group of 782 households with an average annual
before-tax income of $6,850 and a second non-poverty status group with 3,087
households with an average annual after-tax income of $33,244, indicating that one-fifth
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of the sample households were eligible for government food aid. They find expenditure
elasticity for FAFH to be positive and greater than one for both groups, but the income
elasticity of FAFH is positive and greater than one only for the poverty status group.
Thus they conclude that FAFH is a luxury good for poverty status group but a normal
good for the non-poverty status group. Overall their poverty status group was more
responsive to changes in income than the non-poverty group.
Finkelstein et al, 2010 investigate the differential impact of targeted beverage taxes on
higher- and lower-income households. They use data from Nielsen Homescan panel,
which includes a national sample of households that scan and transmit their store-bought
food and beverages weekly for a 12-month period. They use multivariate regression
models to predict the effects of 20% and 40% price increases by estimating the
association between changes in monthly beverage prices and changes in kilocalories
purchased. The first part of their 2-part model estimates a logistic regression on the
probability of positive purchases in a given month as a function of average monthly
prices in the market for each beverage category and other covariates; while the second
part estimates a regression of the same prices and covariates on log-kilocalories (per
person per day) for households with positive purchases. The tax simulations were piloted
by raising the relevant prices faced by each household either by 20% or 40% and using
the model coefficients to estimate reductions in kilocalories purchased as a result of the
tax. They then used the predictions from the tax simulations to estimate per capita and
aggregate tax revenue by income quartile resulting from each tax strategy. Their results
showed that a 20% and 40% tax on all sugar-sweetened beverages would reduce per
capita purchases by an average of 10 and 17.1 kilocalories respectively. Middle-income
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households had the largest estimated reductions in kilocalories as a result of the tax while
the lowest and highest income quartiles were not statistically different from 0. A 20% tax
raised $1.5 billion per year in revenue while a 40% tax generated annual revenue of $2.5
billion. Lower-income households purchase more sugar-sweetened beverages than
higher-income households but since they make purchases at a lower average price (e.g.
make purchases in lower ta nbxed/less affluent neighborhoods) and are more sensitive to
prices their share of the tax was less than that of higher income households. For a 40%
tax imposed, lowest income households would pay 20%, middle income households
would pay 25%, whilst the highest income households would pay 30% of the tax.
FAFH expenditure of senior households
The proportion of elderly/retires in America’s population has been increasing; it was
11.3% in 1980, 12.6% in 1990 and 14% in 2010; while its estimated that by 2050 a
fourth of America’s population will be over 65 (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997). The
definition of senior consumers vary by researcher; some consider 55 years and older as a
senior group (Fleischer & Pizam, 2002; Hong et al., 1999) while others view those 65 and
older as seniors (Abdel-Ghany & Sharpe, 1997). The literature generally concurs that
retirees spend less on food-away-from-home (Blisard and Baylock, 1994; Chen and Cho,
1982; Ketkar and Cho 1982).
Adel-Ghany and Sharpe use data on 2,810 elderly households drawn from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey to conduct a Multivariate Tobit
analysis. Instead of treating the elderly as a homogenous group they examine spending
pattern differences between households with a reference person aged 65-74 (young-old)
and aged 75 and above (old-old). They test whether there are differences in spending
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patterns between the two age groups while controlling for the influence of selected sociodemographic variables and then examine the influence of the select socio-demographic
variables on the significantly different expenditure categories. Total expenditures were
higher for the younger group, at $21,333, compared to $15,985 for the older group. They
find significant differences in spending patterns between the two groups of households
for ten expenditure categories including expenditures on food-at-home and food-awayfrom-home. Expenditures on food away from home were significantly higher for elderly
households whose reference person had completed high school compared to households
where the reference person did not have a high school degree. The older households
whose reference had some college education spent significantly more on both food at
home and food away from home compared to their counterparts without a high school
degree. Urban west elderly residents spent significantly more than elderly rural residents
on food at home.
In general, higher levels of education were significantly associated with relatively larger
numbers of expenditure categories than lower levels of education. They found that
expenditures by households in either age group varied positively with household size for
food at home. Young-old unmarried male-headed households spent relatively more on
FAFH and significantly less on FAH. From the Tobit model they obtained the marginal
propensities (the change in expenditure on a specific category given a change in total
expenditures) to spend for all cases which included cases above the limit as well for cases
at the limit. The young-old age household had higher marginal propensities to spend both
on food at home and food away from home compared to the old-old age group.
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Taking the analysis of the food choices and consumption pattern of senior households
further, Jang et al. (2007) investigate the association of demographic and socioeconomic
variables with food away from home expenditures among senior households. They
examine the two stage nature of the FAFH decision using Heckman’s double hurdle
approach. The first step was a probit regression to estimate the probability of FAFH
participation; the decision as to whether to consume FAFH or not. The second step was to
predict FAFH expenditure; the decision how much to spend on FAFH using a truncated
regression with the inverse mills ratio for correcting sample selection bias. They use data
obtained from the fourth-quarter interview component of the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, compiled by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, which provides a continuous and
comprehensive flow of information about consumer expenditure patterns of US
households. Their results indicate that socio-demographic characteristics are more useful
in understanding the FAFH participation decision of senior households, whilst financial
resources, availability and access to restaurants are better predictors of FAFH
expenditures. They find that average senior households may control their overall FAFH
budget more due to their reduced discretionary income. They however find that even
though graduate-educated seniors were less likely to dine out, they tended to spend
significantly more on FAFH once the FAFH decision was made. Also senior households
that spend more on FAH spent more on FAFH as well demonstrating that FAH may
represent food quality and not a substitute good. Thus the senior households who pay
attention to food quality at home will be significantly more interested in consuming
quality FAFH as well.
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Local Foods and Tax Choke Premiums
Local foods are broadly identified according to dimensions of place and space. The
attributes of local foods include place of origin, uniqueness of the product and physical
access (driving distance) to the product within a geographic location. These attributes
reinforce the perceived benefits and desire for freshness, quality, knowledge of the
product source and support for the local economy among other factors. Consumers may
indicate the level of price or taxes on local foods that would cause them change their
consumption pattern, but in a real-world situation their actual purchasing behavior may
diverge from their originally stated expenditure behavior. Ortiz (2010) analyzes the actual
price premiums that consumers are willing to pay for menu’s featuring local products in a
restaurant setting and evaluates the extent of commitment the consumers have towards
paying the price premiums. The findings suggest higher marginal monetary contributions
to the restaurant selling local menu offerings at a premium price.
Similarly, Sharma and Strohben (2006) analyze the economic impacts of using local
foods in restaurants. They compute the total costs of using local foods in restaurant
operation and compare with the operational costs of other national vendors. Food costs
per pound purchased were averagely lower for local foods ($3.80) as compared to
national vendors ($4.30). Given various menu choices at three price options, 41% of all
participants chose the local food item on the menu while a fourth agreed to pay a price
premium of $2 (36% above average prices). Out of all the participants 45% chose the
menu without any price premium, while 31% chose the menu option with a premium of
$1 (18% higher than regular average prices). Their findings suggest that consumers are
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more willing to support premium prices for local foods, when made aware of local menu
offerings and given the choice to do so. In other words, local foods can be priced higher.
Is the choice of restaurants and restaurant meals price /tax sensitive?
Are food demand choices independent of prices/taxes? A study by Andreyeva, Long and
Brownwell (2010) reviewing 160 studies on the price elasticity of demand for 16 major
food and beverage categories, revealed that food away from home was the most
responsive to price changes thus suggesting larger relative changes in consumer
purchases. Demand for food is relatively inelastic yet the effects of a small tax/price
change on foods that are very responsive to such changes accumulate across a population
(Andreyeva et al). Low-income households exhibit more substitution within commodity
aggregates than households with higher incomes as price elasticities for all goods are
lower for the upper social classes and some price elasticities are even non-significant
(Smed et al., 2007).
When price of restaurant meals increase, either by legislative proposed tax or increased
restaurant costs, consumers may either consume more of restaurant meals (while
consuming less of some other good), may consume the same amount as they previously
did or they may consume less. The overall total effect would depend on whether the
income effect or substitution effect is stronger. The consumers may either substitute one
restaurant for the other or one meal for the other (cheaper or untaxed meals). How much
consumption would change would also be dependent on the tax level and the consumer’s
awareness of it.
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Summary
While previous work gives little insight into the level of taxes that causes consumers to
change their consumption pattern at restaurants, it indicates a relationship between
consumer’s socio-demographic characteristics, restaurant consumption/expenditure
pattern as well as the economic impact. This paper builds on the previous literature.
Using a Tobit model we analyze the level of tax that would cause consumers to eat less
frequently at restaurants or change the meal that they would typically consume; we
examine the socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant preference of the
restaurants consumers mostly affected by the tax.
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Conceptual model
Demand for a market good or services can be derived as a function of household
variables such as household income, value of time as a measure of the household’s
opportunity cost, and other household characteristics (Lancaster, 1966, 1971). This
section discusses the concept of threshold price. The conceptual model for this study is a
theoretical framework representing the quantitative relationship between our dependent
variable of threshold price and the relevant behavioral and socio-demographic variables.
The model serves two main functions: first, a simplification and abstraction from our
observed data and second, selection of data based on economic theory.
Introduction
The basic theorem underlying the concept of demand asserts that when the price/cost of a
good or service (restaurant meals in our case) increases, the rational consumer would
demand a lesser quantity of the said good or service. In essence the amount of the
commodity that the consumer is willing to purchase at a certain price falls in response to
the price/cost increase. This reflects the inverse relationship between price and quantity
demanded of goods and services. Demand however remains unaffected (constant).
I hypothesize that for every unit increase in the cost of restaurant meals, there is not an
exact, corresponding decrease in quantity demanded of restaurant meals. However,
beyond the consumer’s threshold price for the restaurant meal, then the consumer’s
quantity demanded of restaurant meals ultimately falls.
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Key Concepts
There is a psychological component to consumers’ perception of prices. Threshold price
in economic literature refers to the fixing of prices to draw a consumer up to a certain
threshold. I theorize that for a unit increase in the cost of restaurant meals, the level of
satisfaction of the consumer may restrict his/her quantity demanded from falling. Thus
for the purposes of our study we redefine the threshold price point as the point beyond
which a cost increase in restaurant meals that would cause a consumer to eat less
frequently at the restaurant or change the meal that they would typically purchase. Thus it
relates cost increases to changes in consumer behavior and consumption.
Economics, marketing and advertising analysts note that consumers have “dead-zones”
within which they don’t discriminate between higher and lower price points. We
subsequently refer to threshold price-range as the range within which in the event of a
price increase in the cost of a restaurant meal, the expenditure behavior of the consumer
would not change. In essence this captures the minute region where the consumers
demand for the restaurant meal is relatively inelastic. Thus if the consumer is within the
threshold price-range and the cost of restaurant meals increase, the consumer would
continue to consume the same quantity as previously demanded. However, when the
consumer moves to the end of the threshold price-range, he/she reaches the threshold
price, above which expenditure behavior is subject to change.
Theoretical Model
By the law of demand, a price increase leads to a fall in quantity demanded (Krugman
and Wells, 2005). Consumers generally respond to price increases by reducing the
quantity demanded of a commodity, good or service. They either decrease their quantity
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demanded by a small amount or by a large amount. The degree of responsiveness of
quantity demanded to changes in price is referred to as price elasticity of demand
(Krugman and Wells, 2005). This number measures, for instance, by how much a
household would reduce their quantity demanded for restaurant meals if the cost of
restaurant meals increases. Pauwels, Srinivasan and Franses (2007) assess the impact of
price thresholds on price elasticities.
The price elasticity of demand numerically values the percent change in quantity
demanded as a result of this price change along the demand curve (Krugman and Wells,
2005). A sufficient condition for the existence of Threshold price is that the consumer
demand curve has points of inelasticity along it (the demand curve). More negative
values signify higher price sensitivity and thus a less willingness to pay for tax, price or
meal cost increases. Conversely, positive values signify a less price sensitivity and thus a
higher likelihood of paying for restaurant tax, price or meal cost increases.
Figure 4.1 shows a hypothetical restaurant scenario where prices increase from P0 to P1
and then to P2. Points A’, B’ and C’ reflect inelastic points along the consumers threshold
range.
We show this proposition with the aid of the diagram below:
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Figure 4.1 Conventional and Modified Demand Schedule

The first diagram in Figure 4.1 above is the conventional demand curve, which reflects
prices on the y-axis and corresponding quantities demanded on the x-axis. The second
diagram in Figure 4.1 provides/proposes a slightly modified version with slight step-like
irregular kinks along the demand schedule to emphasize the concept of threshold price.
When restaurant prices increase from P0 to P1, conventional demand predicts that quantity
demand for restaurant meals would fall from X1 to X2. However in the modified demand
curve, if the consumer is within his/her threshold price-range (vertical portion of the
demand curve) quantity demanded may not fall in response to price increases. At point
A’ and B’, demand remains at X’1 when prices increase from P0 to P1. Thus in the
modified demand schedule, demand for restaurant meals remains elastic at X’1 after the
hypothetical cost increase in restaurant meals. However, an increase in price to P2 goes
beyond the threshold price to point C’ and the consumer reduces quantity demanded to
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X2. Thus beyond the threshold price consumers alter their expenditure behavior there-by
demanding less of restaurant meals or changing what they would typically purchase.
Factors That Affect or Predict Threshold price
The desire to use restaurant services may be motivated by several reasons including
family celebrations, leisure, business and the ease of not having to cook (Pedraja and
Yague, 2001). Restaurant characteristics have been found to affect meal duration and
spending (Kimes and Robson, 2004). Pauwels et al. (2007) examine category and brand
characteristics that might influence the presence, nature and size of price thresholds and
price elasticity differences. This section highlights the factors that affect the threshold
price or threshold range of consumers. We broadly categorize the exogenous factors that
affect, influence and predict the threshold price of consumers’ restaurant meals into
household socio-demographic characteristics and preference for specific restaurant
characteristics. These characteristics make the threshold range wider or narrower.

Sociodemographic
characteristics

Restaurant
characteristics

Threshold
Pricepoint

Figure 4.2 Factors Affecting Threshold Prices
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The household socio-demographic characteristics that influence threshold price include
consumers’ income, education, gender, marital status, county of residence, rural or urban
location and number of persons in the household. The restaurant characteristics that affect
consumers’ threshold price include chain restaurants over independent restaurants, fullservice over fast-casual service, quality of food and service, local food, menu variety and
portion sizes offered at the restaurant.

Age
Chain
restauant

Gender

Local food

Income
Threshold
Pricepoint

Frequency
of visit

Education

Marital
status

Tax rates
Price

Figure 4.3 Characteristics Influencing Threshold Price
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The interaction of different socio-demographic characteristics and preferences of
restaurant characteristics for the consumer culminates in varying threshold prices and
demand schedules for each consumer.
Summary
The contribution of this study to the literature is that it applies the concept of
threshold price to restaurant taxes. The study explores the cost increase of restaurant
meals that would cause consumers to patronize less of the restaurant meals or change
what they would usually consume. I term/call this the consumer’s threshold price.
The introduction of a restaurant tax may reduce present, near term and even future
threshold price and consumption.
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Research Methodology
Data Description, Subjects and Procedure
The study relies on a survey1 designed to elicit changes in the demand pattern of
consumers’ dining in restaurants in relation to changes in the cost of restaurant meals.
The survey was conducted online and administered to adult consumers living within the
counties of Kentucky. The target population was Kentucky adults over 18 years of age,
estimated to be 3,315,996 in 2012 (US Census Bureau).
The survey contained sections on consumer eating patterns/habits; frequency of eating in
restaurants and the average cost per meal. On a scale of 0 to 60 respondents were asked to
select by how much the cost of restaurant meals would have to increase before they
would eat in a restaurant less frequently or change what they typically purchase in
restaurants. The respondents were also presented with two scenarios in which they were
allowed to specify their preference for chain restaurants over independent restaurants;
fast-casual/quick-service; quality of service and food; local variety of foods and portion
sizes served when there was no change in cost of restaurant meals compared to a 3%
increase. This section was designed to elicit the change of behavior between
regular demand and an associated increase in restaurant taxes. Sociodemographic characteristics were also collected in the final section of the survey.

1

See Han J. (2013) for details of the survey.

31

The response rate of the survey was 22%. Out of all respondents 1,252 respondents fully
completed the entire survey. The survey population was 37% male and 63% female. In
general, higher income households were represented more in the survey response than
other income groups in the population.
Measures
The following measures were self-reported by each respondent.
Behavioral Variables
Typically eat in restaurants. This is a dummy variable which captures whether the
respondent typically eats in a restaurant at least once a month or not. As a precursor, this
question sets the stage for the subsequent questions in the survey. Of the 1,162 sampled
respondents being used for this study, all affirmed that they eat in a restaurant at least
once a month.
Frequency of eating in restaurants variable captures the number of times the respondent
eats in a restaurant per month. On a scale of 0 to 20 respondents were asked to indicate
how many times, on average, that they eat breakfast, lunch and/or dinner per month in
restaurants.
Cost per meal is a variable which captures the average cost of a typical meal.
Respondents were given ranges and asked to indicate their average cost of breakfast,
lunch and dinner at restaurants.
Higher neighborhood tax is a binary variable indicative of whether the respondent would
opt for restaurants in lower tax communities. Respondents were asked ‘if tax rates on
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restaurant meals in one community were 3% to 5% higher than in a neighboring
community, would this cause you to choose restaurants in communities with lower taxes
if the same restaurant option were available in those communities?’ 47% respondents said
they would choose restaurants in communities with lower taxes and 53% said otherwise.
The price variable is a dummy which indicates whether or not price is an important factor
to the respondent for when choosing a restaurant. Of the sampled respondents 20% said
price is the most important factor for selecting a restaurant while 80% said price is not the
most important factor for them in restaurant selection.
Check tax. This variable captures whether the respondent notices all taxes charged when
paying a restaurant check. 51% of the sample responded saying they notice all taxes
charged when paying the check, with 49% saying they do not notice all taxes charged.
Economic outlook is a dummy for whether respondent believes overall economic outlook
is improving or not. 56% of the respondents believe that overall economic outlook is
improving.
Tax vote is a variable indicating whether the respondent would vote for adding a
restaurant tax. Respondents were asked if they would vote for adding a tax on restaurant
meals in their city it the tax revenue was used for promoting tourism or operating an
arena. Out the sampled respondents, 21% said they would vote in favor of the restaurant
tax if it would facilitate the promotion of tourism within their city while 79% said they
wouldn’t vote for such a tax.
Preference for chain restaurants is a variable that captures the respondent’s inclination
towards chain restaurants over independent restaurants. On a 5-point likert scale,
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respondents indicated how strongly they preferred chain restaurants. Out of the sampled
respondents 26% strongly disagreed, 32% disagreed, 30% were neutral, 10% agreed
while 1.5% strongly agreed to the question of preference of chain restaurants over
independent restaurants.
Table 5-1 Preference for Chain Restaurants over Independent Restaurants
Prefer chain restaurant
Freq.
Percent
Cum.
Strongly disagree
297
25.56
25.56
Disagree
375
32.27
57.83
Neutral
352
30.29
88.12
Agree
121
10.41
98.54
Strongly agree
17
1.46
100
Total
1,162
100

The variable ‘prefer full service’ indicates the respondent’s preference for full-service
restaurants over fast-casual or quick service restaurants. The 5-point likert scale captured
respondent’s level of preference for full service restaurants. Out of the sampled
respondents 1.2% strongly disagreed, 11% disagreed, 30% were neutral, 38% agreed
while 20% strongly agreed to the question of preference of full-service restaurants over
fast-casual and/or quick-service restaurants.
Table 5-2 Preference for Full-service Restaurants over Quick-service Restaurants
Prefer full service
Freq.
Percent
Cum.
Strongly disagree
14
1.2
1.2
Disagree
131
11.27
12.48
Neutral
349
30.03
42.51
Agree
441
37.95
80.46
Strongly agree
227
19.54
100
Total
1,162
100
‘Prefer local foods’ is a variable that expresses respondents’ penchant for restaurants that
use local foods in their menu offerings. Respondent preferences were recorded on a 534

point likert scale. Out of the sampled households who responded to this section 2%
strongly disagreed, 4% disagreed, 31% were neutral, 39% agreed while 23% strongly
agreed to the question of preference of restaurants that use local foods in their menu
offerings.
Table 5-3 Preference for Local Food on Menu Offerings
Prefer local foods menu
Freq.
Percent
Strongly disagree
23
1.98
Disagree
45
3.87
Neutral
364
31.33
Agree
457
39.33
Strongly agree
273
23.49
Total
1,162
100

Cum.
1.98
5.85
37.18
76.51
100

Socio-demographic Variables
The demographic variables reported included respondent’s age2 in years presented in
ranges. The age ranges used for the analysis are 18-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and above 60.
This study regards those households that are headed by someone older than 60 years as
senior households. In our sample 16 % fall within the 18-30 age range, 20% between the
31-40 age range, 23% in the 41-50 age range, 29% within the 51-60 age range and 13%
as senior households.

2

Age and age-squared generally captures the curvilinear nature of the influence of age in
a model, however we use age ranges in our analysis to enable comparison of different age
groups in response to taxes.
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Table 5-4 Distribution of Age Group
Age range
Freq.
18 - 30
184
31-40
230
41-50
267
51-60
335
60+
146
Total
1,162

Percent
15.83
19.79
22.98
28.83
12.56
100

Cum.
15.83
35.63
58.61
87.44
100

The highest level of education completed was also provided in categories. Of the sampled
respondents 0.2% had ‘less than high school degree’, 9 % had a ‘high school degree/GED
equivalent’, 12% had a ‘2-year college degree’, 25% had a ‘4-year college degree’ and
54% had a ‘graduate/professional degree’.
Table 5-5 Distribution of Highest Level of Education Completed
Education
Freq.
Percent
< High school degree
2
0.17
High school/GED equivalent
100
8.61
2-year college degree
142
12.22
4-year college degree
294
25.3
Graduate/professional degree
624
53.7
Total
1,162
100

Cum.
0.17
8.78
21
46.3
100

The income bracket of respondents’ combined annual household income were also
gathered and recoded into quintiles to facilitate the analysis. We recode the original 15
income brackets into five categories: under $20,000 as low income; $20,000-49,999 as
middle-low income; $50,000-99,999 as middle income; $100,000-149,999 as middlehigh income; and $150,000 plus as high income brackets. Of the respondents, 4% fell
into the low income bracket, 17% in the middle-low income bracket, 40% in the middle
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income bracket, 25% in the middle-high income bracket and 14% in the high income
bracket.
Table 5-6 Distribution of Income Group
Income Group
Freq.
Low income
45
Middle-low
194
Middle income
463
Middle-high
292
High income
168
Total
1,162

Percent
3.87
16.7
39.85
25.13
14.46
100

Cum.
3.87
20.57
60.41
85.54
100

Household size3. The respondents were asked to indicate the number of persons in their
household. 17% of the respondents had single-member households, 41% had 2-member
households, 18% had households comprising 3 members, 16% had 4-member
households, while 8% of the respondents had more households comprised of 5 or more
members.
Table 5-7 Distribution of Household Size
Household no.
Freq.
1
203
2
476
3
205
4
187
5 or more
91
Total
1,162

Percent
17.47
40.96
17.64
16.09
7.83
100

3

Cum.
17.47
58.43
76.08
92.17
100

We use number of persons to capture the size of food demand of each household. Lee
and Brown (1986) include the square of household size in their model to capture the
effects of economies of scale in food consumption.
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City Size is a locational categorical variable that was derived from the zip codes provided
by the respondents. We recode Kentucky’s six city categories into large and small city
sizes. 70% of the respondents were from large cities that have a population of more than
20,000. The remaining 30% were from relatively smaller cities with population sizes less
than 19,000.
Table 5-8 Distribution of City Classes
City size (population)

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

20,000+
8,000-19,999
3,000-7,999
1000-2,999
<999
Total

820
115
178
28
21
1,162

70.57
9.9
15.32
2.41
1.81
100

70.57
80.46
95.78
98.19
100

The respondents’ zip-codes were subsequently pooled together to obtain county-defined
regions. Some of the counties had few responses - from less than five respondents which may be unrepresentative of the said counties, thus the counties were further
grouped into area development districts. The figure below displays the average threshold
price for respondents represented in each of Kentucky’s Area Development District
(ADD).
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Figure 5.1 Area Development Districts in Kentucky by Threshold Prices

Threshold price. The threshold price was estimated with the question ‘by how much
would the total cost of restaurant meals have to increase before you eat less frequently at
restaurants or change what you typically purchase in a restaurant?’ Respondents were
shown a scale from 0 to 60% and asked to indicate the percentage increase in cost that
would lead them to change their restaurant food purchasing habits. The percentage of
respondents that reported a 3% tax threshold price or less was 6%. The remainder of the
population reporting between 4-10% tax level was 27%; 35% of the respondents selected
a tax level between 11-20%; 22% respondents opted for tax levels between 21-30%; 4%
of the respondents chose a tax level between 31-40%; 3% respondents selected a tax level
from 41-50%; and 2% of the respondents were willing to select a tax level of 51-60%.
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Table 5-9 Distribution of Threshold Price
Threshold price
(%)
Freq.
0-3
71
4-10
315
11-20
406
21-30
259
31-40
46
41-50
39
51-60
26
Total
1,162

Percent
6.11
27.11
34.94
22.29
3.96
3.36
2.24
100

Cum.
6.11
33.22
68.16
90.45
94.41
97.76
100

Figure 5.2 below graphs a histogram of the distribution of the threshold price points for
households in Kentucky. The observations are slightly skewed to the left, with an average
threshold price point of 17%. Most of the threshold price point observations were
clustered at regular intervals of 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25. This presupposes that households
prefer to report the practicality of working with regular multiples of numbers rather than
an arbitrary value, to reflect/rank their selection of threshold price point. The censoring of
the observations at 0 and 60 also inform the empirical model to be used for the analysis.
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of TPP with Normal Density Curve Imposed

Specification of Tobit Model
The analysis of restaurant tax on meals and how it affects demand for restaurants and
restaurant meals by different socio-demographic households raises important issues. Of
the sampled respondents 6% indicated a threshold price of 3% or less. Cumulatively,
33%, 68% and 90% of the respondents selected a threshold price of 10%, 20% and 30%
respectively. Moreover 0.4% of the respondents selected a threshold price of 0.
Excluding the zero/non-positive observations of the threshold price may result in a
deficiency of the estimation procedure also known as omitted variable bias (this would
have been more pertinent if a larger percentage of observations in the data was clustered
at zero). It can be argued that the resultant estimation is a truncated model and inferences
are made only for the subpopulation known to have positive threshold prices but the
sample may no longer probabilistic, as it should be according to the sampling procedure
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for the survey (Cai, 1998). Furthermore, excluding the households reporting zero
threshold price is tantamount to the assumption that these households and those
represented by them will not be in the food consumption market or will not purchase
meals at restaurants.
The statistical technique generally applied in analyzing the relationship between
household expenditures and characteristics is the Classical Linear Regression (CLR).
Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the model may result in biased and
inconsistent estimators because of some missing or zero observations in the survey
response. The OLS regression treats the upper and lower limits as the actual values thus
when the variable is censored the coefficients from the analysis will not necessarily
approach the "true" population parameters as the sample size increases.
This study employs the use of a Tobit model, also called a censored regression model,
devised by Tobin (1958) for econometric analysis. Tobit analysis is a theoretically
preferred technique as it allows the inclusion of zero-value observations. According to
McCracken and Brandt (1987) and McDonald and Moffitt (1980), the Tobit technique
not only calls for the inclusion of all observations, which increases estimation efficiency,
but it also allows estimation of both the quantity responses of households actively making
restaurant purchases and the quantity responses resulting from changes in the household
probability of not making any restaurant purchases at all. In other words, the total
marginal effects of a household’s characteristics on its threshold price can be
decomposed into two meaningful components: (a) quantity effects conditional to positive
threshold prices (conditional effects) and (b) quantity effects solely resulting from the
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probability that the household moves from zero/no threshold price to positive threshold
price (market participation effects).
The Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable has a number of its values clustered
at a limiting value, usually zero and it uses all observations both those at the limit and
those above the limit to estimate a regression line. It is designed to estimate linear
relationships between variables when there is either left- (censoring from below) or rightcensoring (censoring from above) in the dependent variable. Censoring from above takes
place when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of that
threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be
higher. In the case of censoring from below, values those that fall at or below some
threshold are censored. Thus for a censored Y, we observe all the X but know the true
value of Y for a restricted range of observations.
The Tobit model is a combination of two models, the probit model which determines
whether y=0 or y>0 and a truncated regression model for y>0. The coefficients from
Tobit estimation can be used to determine both changes in the probability of being above
the limit and changes in the value of the dependent variable if it is already above the limit
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). The Tobit analysis assumes that the likelihood of the
FAFH decision and the level of FAFH expenditures are determined by the same set of
explanatory variables.
Specifically, we will use the Tobit model to examine if a particular characteristic explains
threshold price variations when the others are controlled. We can thus estimate an
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econometric model with a left-censoring at zero threshold price and a right censoring at
60%.
The stochastic model underlying Tobit may be expressed as follows:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 β + 𝜇𝑡
=0

if 𝑋𝑡 β + 𝜇𝑡 > 0
if 𝑋𝑡 β + 𝜇𝑡 ≤ 0,
t = 1, 2, …, N,
where N is the number of observations,
𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable,
𝑋𝑡 is a vector of independent variables,
β is a vector of unknown coefficients and
𝜇𝑡 is an independently distributed error term assumed to be normal with zero mean and constant
variance 𝜎 2

The Tobit model has a censored normal distribution which includes a conditional
continuous part as well as a discrete part. The primary dependent variable of our analysis,
TP (threshold price), is defined as how much the total cost of restaurant meals would
have to increase before respondents eat less frequently at restaurants or change what they
typically purchase in a restaurant. We estimate the empirical model of the threshold price
as a function of income, average cost/expenditure at a restaurant, frequency of restaurant
visits and other demographic factors.
Empirical Model:
𝑇𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛼3 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼4 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼5 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝛼6 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛼7 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼8 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛼10 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝐸𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼11 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼12 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛼13 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼14 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼15 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥
+ 𝛼16 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛼17 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
+ 𝛼18 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼19 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛼20 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 + ε
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 is the combined household’s annual income, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 is age category of the
respondent, 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the highest level of education completed of the respondent,
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑i , is the number of people in the respondents household, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a dummy
variable reflecting the gender of the respondent, 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is a binary variable
indicative of whether the respondent would opt for restaurants in lower tax communities,
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable capturing whether price is an important factor for
choosing a restaurant, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the average cost of a typical restaurant breakfast,
lunch or dinner meal, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝐸𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy which captures whether the respondent
typically eats in a restaurant at least once a month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 is the number of
times the respondent eats breakfast in a restaurant per month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖 reflects how
often the respondent eats lunch at a restaurant each month, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖 captures the
frequency of dinner at a restaurant per month, 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is whether the respondent
notices all taxes charged when paying the restaurant check, 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 is whether the
respondent would vote for adding a restaurant tax if the revenue is used for promoting
tourism, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 is a dummy for whether respondent believes economic
outlook is improving, 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is categorical variable indicating the class of city of the
respondent’s location, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a categorical variable that indicates how
strongly the respondent prefers chain restaurants over independent restaurants,
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 is a categorical variable that captures how strongly the respondent prefers
full-service restaurants to fast-casual/quick-service restaurants, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 is a
categorical variable that specifies how strongly the respondent prefers restaurants that use
local foods in their menu offerings.
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Marginal Effects of the Tobit Model
The marginal effects are computed for the latent dependent variable, the expected value
of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored, the unconditional expected
value of the dependent variable, and the probability of being uncensored. Following Cong
(2000), where a is the lower censored limit and b is the upper censored limit, we rewrite
the Tobit model as:
𝑦𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 < 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑏
𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑎
𝑦𝑖∗ = { 𝑎,
𝑏,
𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑏

The four forms of marginal effects are:
1. The β coefficients themselves which are the changes in the mean of the latent
dependent variable: 𝛽 = 𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 )/𝜕𝑥𝑖
2. The changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable:
𝜕𝐸(𝑦∗𝑖 )/𝜕𝑥𝑖
3. The changes in the conditional expected value of the dependent variable: 𝜕𝐸(𝑦∗𝑖 ) | 𝑎 <
𝑦∗𝑖 < 𝑏)/𝜕𝑥𝑖

4. The changes in the probability of being uncensored: 𝜕𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑦∗𝑖 < 𝑏)/𝜕𝑥𝑖
In lieu with McDolald and Moffitt (1980), given the expectation of y* as
E(y*) = P( y* > 0) E( y* | y* > 0),
the effect of a change in the jth continuous variable of X on E(y*) can be expressed as:
∂E(y*)/ ∂xj = P(y* > 0) ∂E(y*) | y* > 0) / ∂xj + E(y* | y* > 0) ∂P(y* > 0)/ ∂xj
The coefficients of the Tobit regression may be interpreted as the effect on the
household’s threshold price as a result of variations in socio-demographic variables and
preferences restaurant characteristics.
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Empirical Results & Discussion
This chapter highlights the results of our empirical model and subsequently delves into a
discussion of the results. Table 6.1 below lists the behavioral and socio-demographic
variables with their forms and a prior expected signs. Table 6.2 also gives the descriptive
statistics of the variables used for the analysis.
Table 6-1 Variable forms and their expected signs
Variable
Form
Threshold price
Continuous
Income Group
Categorical
Income
Continuous
Age (age group)
Categorical
Education
Categorical
Household number
Categorical
Gender_male
Binary
Higher_neighbourhood_tax
Binary
Price_important
Binary
Cost_meal
Continuous
Freq_breakfast
Categorical
Freq_lunch
Categorical
Freq_dinner
Categorical
Check_tax
Binary
Vote_tax
Binary
Economic_outlook
Binary
City_class
Categorical
Pref_chain_restaurant
Categorical
Pref_full_service
Categorical
Pref_local_food
Categorical
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Expected/Hypothesized Sign
N/A
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable
Obs
Mean
Threshold price
1162
17.76
freq_breakfast
1,162
1.89
freq_lunch
1162
5.89
freq_dinner
1162
6.38
avg_price_meal
1162
13.80
higher_neighborhood_tax 1162
0.47
price_important
1162
0.20
check_tax
1162
0.51
economic_outlook
1162
0.56
Vote
1162
0.21
Gender
1162
0.37
household_number
1162
2.56
age_group
1162
3.02
income_group
1162
3.30
Education
1162
4.24
Citysize
1162
1.55
pref_chain_restaurant
1162
2.30
pref_full_service
1162
3.63
pref_local_food
1162
3.78

Std. Dev.
11.77
2.92
5.16
4.20
7.11
0.50
0.40
0.50
0.50
0.40
0.48
1.18
1.27
1.03
0.98
0.96
1.01
0.96
0.91

Min
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Max
60
20
20
20
48
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Statistical Analysis/ Modeling Procedure
All analyses are done using Stata software. The likelihood ratio test statistic is used to test
for the overall significance of the set of variables included in the varying forms of the
modeling procedures. The results are tested to ascertain if they are statistically and
economically significantly different from zero using the alpha-level tests. Robust
standard errors are used to correct for possible autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the
model specification.
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Results of the OLS and Tobit Models
The results of the OLS and Tobit models are shown in Table 6.3 below. The chi-squared
value of 158, 157.9 and 159 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0000 indicates that the
variations of our Tobit models are a suitable fit for the analysis of socio-demographic
characteristics and restaurant preferences of households in Kentucky. The ancillary
statistic “/sigma” is analogous to the square root of the residual variance in OLS
regression. The output provides a summary of the number of left-censored, uncensored
and right-censored values of the Tobit estimations. The first Tobit model has 5 leftcensored observations, 1148 uncensored observations and 9 right-censored observations.
The second Tobit model, which has a left (from below) censoring, has 5 left-censored
observations and 1157 uncensored observations. The third Tobit model in our result table
has 1153 uncensored observations and 9 right censored observations.
The coefficient estimates of the Tobit models are very similar to that of the OLS model,
however we focus on the Tobit model with both a left and right censoring. This is
because we know the true value of our dependent variable (threshold price) for a
restricted range of observations (0 to 60). The coefficient for frequency of dinner is
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level. It indicates that, ceteris paribus, for each
additional time that a household eats dinner in a restaurant, the threshold price of that
household increases by 0.2%. The parameter estimate for higher neighborhood tax is
statistically significant at the 1% alpha level. All else equal, compared to households that
did not have the option and/or would not eat at the same restaurant in neighboring
communities operating with 3-5% lower tax rates, for households that had the option and
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would go to such lower-rate restaurants, on average, we expect their threshold price to be
lower by 3%.
The variable for average cost of meal was statistically significant at the 10% alpha level.
Ceteris paribus, households that purchase restaurant meals at a higher average cost have a
0.1% higher threshold price than households who purchase meals at a lower average cost.
The coefficient estimate for the variable check-tax was significantly at the 1% alpha
level. Holding all things constant, on average, households who always notice all the taxes
charged when paying a restaurant check have a 2% lower tax threshold price than
households who do not notice the taxes charged. The parameter estimate for vote was
statistically significant at the 5% alpha level. This suggests that households that are
willing to pay for an additional tax on restaurant meals if the tax would be used in
promoting tourism have 2% higher threshold price, compared to households that would
not vote for such a tax.
The parameter estimate for the age category 51-60 was statistically significant at the 10%
alpha level. All other things being equal, on average, compared to households aged
between 18-30, households close to retirement age (51-60) have 2% lower threshold
price. The coefficients for the low-middle and middle income households was statistically
significant at the 10% alpha level, that for the middle-high income group was statistically
significant at the 5% alpha level, while the coefficient for the high income households
was significant at the 1% alpha level. Ceteris paribus, on average, compared to low
income households, low-middle income households, middle income households, middlehigh income households and high income households have 3%, 3%, 4% and 8% higher
threshold prices, respectively.
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The variables for 2-year college and graduate/professional degree were statistically
significant and positive at the 10% significant level. The coefficients indicate that, ceteris
paribus, compared to a household with a high school diploma, a household with some 2year college degree and a household with a graduate or professional degree have a 2%
higher threshold price. There’s no statistical indication of whether having less than a high
school diploma or having a 4-year college degree compared to a high school diploma
increases or decreases the households’ threshold price.
The variable for class of city was not statistically significant. This implies that, all things
equal, compared to households in 1st and 2nd (the largest) class cities, households in 3rd,
4th, 5th and 6th sized cities do not have a higher or lower threshold price points. In other
words, all things being equal, households that live in larger sized cities do not have a
higher or lower threshold price, compared to households that live in smaller-sized cities.
This presupposes that the city within which a household lives, whether rural or urban, has
no effect on their threshold price.
The variable representing households that strongly prefer full service over fastcasual/quick-service restaurants has a statistically significant threshold price at the 10%
alpha level. Compared to households that are neutral about preferences for full-services
over quick-service restaurants, households that strongly prefer full-service restaurants
have a 2% higher threshold price. Conversely, households that do not strongly prefer fullservice restaurants, compared to neutral households, have a 4% lower threshold price.
This variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level.
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In our model, the variable capturing households that do prefer restaurants that serve local
food was statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that households that
strongly prefer restaurants that offer local foods, compared to neutral households, have a
2% lower threshold price. However, the variable measuring no strong preference for
restaurants that serve local foods was statistically significant at the 5% alpha level.
Households that do not strongly prefer restaurants that serve local foods have a 5% lower
threshold price, compared to households that are neutral about restaurants that serve local
foods.
The number of individuals per household, economic outlook of households, and the
importance of price did not have any statistically significant effect on the threshold price.
It was expected that because it costs more to feed a larger household and thus to cut costs,
one additional person per household may negatively influence threshold price, but this
was not reflected in the analysis. Some levels of education and the gender of main
respondent in the household were also not statistically significant. Neither is there any
statistical significance on the preference of chain restaurants over independent restaurant.
Table 6-3 Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP
VARIABLES
Frequency of breakfast
Frequency of lunch
Frequency of dinner
Avg. cost of meal
Higher neighborhood tax

OLS

Tobit1

Tobit2
(Left-censored)

Tobit3
(Right-cen sored)

0.140

0.134

0.133

0.141

(0.140)

(0.141)

(0.140)

(0.138)

-0.0941

-0.0980

-0.0955

-0.0966

(0.0792)

(0.0786)

(0.0780)

(0.0785)

0.233**

0.239**

0.236**

0.236**

(0.0981)

(0.0984)

(0.0967)

(0.0981)

0.107*

0.106*

0.105*

0.108*

(0.0575)

(0.0579)

(0.0573)

(0.0571)

-2.632***

-2.683***

-2.653***

-2.662***

(0.698)

(0.692)

(0.688)

(0.690)
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Table 6-3 (continued) Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP
VARIABLES
Price important
Check tax
Economic outlook
Vote
Gender
2 person household
3 person household
4 person household
5-or-more person household
Aged 31-40
Aged 41-50
Aged 51-60
Aged 60+
Low-middle
Middle income
Middle-high
High income

OLS

Tobit1

Tobit2
(Left-censored)

Tobit3
(Right-cen sored)

-1.144

-1.144

-1.161

-1.127

(0.841)

(0.838)

(0.830)

(0.835)

-1.883***

-1.863***

-1.872***

-1.874***

(0.711)

(0.706)

(0.701)

(0.704)

0.995

0.984

0.987

0.992

(0.731)

(0.727)

(0.721)

(0.726)

1.998**

2.055**

2.018**

2.034**

(0.888)

(0.885)

(0.874)

(0.884)

-0.0691

-0.0488

-0.0506

-0.0676

(0.720)

(0.715)

(0.710)

(0.713)

-0.229

-0.278

-0.252

-0.255

(1.067)

(1.060)

(1.050)

(1.059)

0.0420

0.00210

0.0451

-0.000769

(1.232)

(1.223)

(1.212)

(1.222)

0.322

0.297

0.340

0.279

(1.351)

(1.340)

(1.329)

(1.338)

-0.896

-0.928

-0.861

-0.964

(1.489)

(1.474)

(1.466)

(1.472)

-1.269

-1.266

-1.277

-1.258

(1.245)

(1.235)

(1.227)

(1.232)

-0.910

-0.892

-0.915

-0.887

(1.295)

(1.285)

(1.274)

(1.283)

-2.097*

-2.108*

-2.106*

-2.099*

(1.195)

(1.184)

(1.176)

(1.183)

-0.564

-0.593

-0.572

-0.585

(1.464)

(1.452)

(1.444)

(1.446)

3.007*

3.055*

3.019*

3.043*

(1.597)

(1.578)

(1.572)

(1.576)

2.805*

2.827*

2.808*

2.823*

(1.616)

(1.595)

(1.591)

(1.593)

3.753**

3.763**

3.733**

3.782**

(1.790)

(1.766)

(1.761)

(1.764)

8.130***

8.176***

8.073***

8.232***

(2.048)

(2.039)

(2.023)

(2.030)

NB: Standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
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Table 6-3(continued) Results of OLS Regression and Censored Tobit models for TPP
VARIABLES
Less than a high school degree
2-year college degree
4-year college degree
Graduate/professional degree

OLS

Tobit1

Not_strongly_pref_chain_rest
Not_pref_chain_rest
Pref_chain_rest
Strongly_pref_chain_rest

Tobit3
(Right-cen sored)

4.535

4.466

4.440

4.561

(4.620)

(4.563)

(4.562)

(4.543)

2.317*

2.302*

2.287*

2.333*

(1.405)

(1.391)

(1.386)

(1.386)

1.959

1.941

1.938

1.962*

(1.207)

(1.191)

(1.188)

(1.190)

2.169*

2.167*
(1.111)

2.155*

2.182**

(1.109)

(1.111)

(1.127)
City size

Tobit2
(Left-censored)

-0.853

-0.896

-0.890

-0.859

(0.731)

(0.727)

(0.724)

(0.722)

0.237

0.226

0.234

0.230

(0.984)

(0.977)

(0.972)

(0.973)

0.235

0.206

0.225

0.216

(0.816)

(0.808)

(0.805)

(0.805)

1.641

1.663

1.665

1.638

(1.306)

(1.296)

(1.285)

(1.294)

-1.183

-1.133

-1.106

-1.211

(2.049)

(2.027)

(2.017)

(2.024)

-4.524*

-4.484**

-4.449*

-4.560**

(2.316)

(2.278)

(2.272)

(2.282)

-0.393

-0.411

-0.409

-0.395

(1.088)

(1.084)

(1.075)

(1.078)

0.630

0.638

0.658

0.610

(0.803)

(0.796)

(0.791)

(0.794)

2.000*

2.025*

2.010*

2.014*

(1.079)

(1.080)

(1.067)

(1.074)

-4.304**

-4.587**

-4.558**

-4.330**

(1.791)

(1.871)

(1.865)

(1.765)

-0.611

-0.645

-0.607

-0.649

(1.929)

(1.899)

(1.897)

(1.898)

-0.831

-0.838

-0.822

-0.848

(0.826)

(0.820)

(0.814)

(0.817)

-2.317**

-2.354**

-2.336**

-2.336**

(0.989)

(0.989)

(0.980)

(0.981)

12.53***

12.59***

12.58***

12.54***

(2.102)

(2.082)

(2.072)

(2.076)

R-squared/ sigma

0.125

11.12***

11.04***

11.08***

(0.315)

(0.299)

(0.312)

Observations

1,162

1,162

1,162

1,162

Not_strongly_ pref_fullservice
Not_pref_fullservice
Pref_fullservice
Strongly_pref_fullservice
Not_strongly__pref_localfoods
Not_pref_localfoods
Pref_localfoods
Strongly_pref_localfoods
Constant
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Discussion
The effect of the frequency of meals on the choice of threshold price was broken down
into breakfast, lunch and dinner frequency effects. The results of the Tobit model suggest
that frequency of dinner has a significant and positive effect on the choice level of tax
choke of households. For each additional time that a household visits a restaurant for
dinner, the threshold price of that household increases by 0.2%. This implies that given
two households with the same socio-demographic characteristics, if the first household
visits a restaurant for dinner five times more than the second household then the first
household would have a threshold price 1% higher than the first household. The
frequency of breakfast and lunch in our model did not have any statistically significant
effects on the threshold prices of households. Interestingly however the frequency of
breakfast had a positive coefficient while the frequency of lunch had a negative
coefficient in the model.
In our Tobit model the effect of price on a household’s threshold price was aggregated
from the price of breakfast, price of lunch and price of dinner. The average price of a
meal was statistically and positively significant in our model. It presupposes that for
every extra dollar that a household pays for the price of a meal that household has a 0.1%
higher threshold price. In other words a household that is willing to pay $5 extra dollars
for a meal has a 0.5% higher threshold price, on average.

Consistent with theory and a priori expectation the variable for higher neighborhood tax
was statistically significant and negative. Compared to households that live in
communities with higher tax rates who would not choose restaurants in communities that
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with lower tax rates if the same restaurant option were available in those communities,
households that would opt for restaurants in lower tax rate communities have a 2% lower
threshold price. This suggests that all else equal, a household living in a community in
Kentucky that would not opt for the same kind of restaurant in a neighborhood with
lower tax rates has a 2% higher threshold price than a household that would take
advantage of that option and thus the aforementioned household is more willing to pay
for tax/cost increases in restaurant meals.

In our model price was not significantly reflected as the most important factor that
households take into consideration when choosing a restaurant to have a meal. The
parameter estimate for price, though not statistically significant from zero, shows that
households who consider price as the most important factor for choosing restaurants may
have a 1% lower threshold price than households who do not consider price as the most
important factor for selecting a restaurant.

All things equal, compared to households who do not notice taxes when paying their
restaurant check, those households that always notice all taxes charged when paying a
restaurant check have a lower threshold price of about 2%. This is consistent with our
expectations and suggests that households who make a conscious effort to observe the
taxes that are levied on their restaurant meals are less willing to pay higher tax rates. On
the other hand, households that seldom or never check the taxes that are levied on their
restaurant meals have a higher threshold price either because they do not mind paying
higher tax rates or they are not even aware of taxes imposed or of the tax increases.
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The economic outlook of households in our model had no significant effect on the level
of thresh price of the households sampled. However, if the variable were significant it
would imply that compared to households who do not believe that the overall economic
outlook is improving, households who believe that the economic outlook is improving
have a 1% higher threshold price. Thus households with a positive economic outlook
would be more willing to pay tax/cost increases in restaurant meals while households
with a negative economic outlook would be less willing to pay cost increases in
restaurant meals. Hence if a household that initially has a negative economic outlook
were to assess the economy, observes growth in the various sectors of the economy and
develop a positive outlook in the process, the threshold price of that household may
increase.
The coefficient estimate for “vote” was statistically and positively significant. It suggests
that households that would vote for a restaurant tax if the proceeds were earmarked to be
used to support tourism have 2% higher threshold price, compared to households that
wouldn’t vote for the tax. This clearly indicates that households that are willing to vote
for a restaurant tax promoting tourism or operating an arena are also more inclined to pay
for such restaurant meal cost increases, since such households have a higher threshold
price. On other hand, households that are not willing to vote for a tax no matter what
cause the generated revenue will be put towards, have a lower threshold price than
households that are more willing to vote for a tax for a cause.

In our model, the parameter estimates for gender and household number were not
statistically different from zero. Nonetheless, male primary respondents may have a
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lower threshold price compared to female primary respondents which may suggest that
female primary respondents may be more willing to pay for restaurant tax increases, if
the variable were significant. Compared to single-households, households with three or
four members have a positive threshold price and hence may be more willing to pay for
tax increases on their restaurant meals. On the other hand households with 5 or more
persons, compared to single-person households, have a negative threshold price and may
thus be less willing to pay for tax increases.

We find that some of the parameter estimates for the age ranges were statistically
significant whilst others were not. Our results show that compared to households aged
less than 30 years old, all the other older age groups have negative (lower) threshold
prices. This implies that the households that are less than 30 years old have the highest
threshold prices and are the most willing to pay restaurant tax increases. Households aged
between 51 and 60 years have the lowest threshold price; they have a 2% lower threshold
price compared to households that are less than 30 years old. This may be because this
age group of households is closer to retirement and are saving towards their retirement
plans/benefits and consequently are less willing to pay tax increases on the meals they eat
at restaurants. It could also imply that elderly households would prefer to eat more at
home than at restaurants. Our results suggest that households that are older than 60 and/or
at retirement do not have a threshold price significantly different from zero though
although they have a negative threshold price compared to households less than 30 years
of age.
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In line with theory and a priori expectations, when compared to the lowest income group,
households in the high income range have the highest threshold price. In comparison to
the lowest income quintile, the low-middle income group has a 3 higher threshold price,
the middle income group also has a 3% higher threshold price, the middle-high income
group has a 4% higher threshold price and the high income group has an 8% higher
threshold price. All equal, high income households have the highest disposable income
and thus generally do not consider eating out as a luxury, thus their food choice behavior
would not be affected much by the additional restaurant tax. Households within the highincome range are the most willing to pay a tax increase on their restaurant meals and they
would therefore contribute most to the tax revenue generated. This may eliminate the
potential regressive nature of taxes and render the restaurant tax progressive.
We find some of the parameter estimates for education in our model to be statistically
different from zero. It suggests that households that have some 2-year degree or a
professional degree have a 2% higher threshold price compared to households that have a
high school certificate or a GED equivalent. The other coefficients though not
statistically significant, indicate that households with less than a high school degree (or
equivalent) may have the highest threshold price. In other words, it would appear that
households with the least level of education are most willing to pay for the meal tax. This
could be because such households may eat out at restaurants more than they eat at home
or they spend more on restaurant food than other essentials compared to households with
higher levels of education. The households with higher levels of education may be more
willing to spend on higher education, bigger homes or more expensive vacations for their
families than they are willing to spend on restaurant taxes. A good proportion of
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households who have some 2-year degree or professional degree could currently be
students and thus compared to a greater proportion of working households with less than
a high school degree, the students have a lower disposable income and hence would be
less willing to spend on increases in taxes on restaurant meals. We can infer and
justifiably argue that if a household without a high school diploma attains or earns a
diploma, their threshold price may fall.

In our model, the coefficients for city class and preference for chain food restaurants
were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficients indicate that compared to
households that live in large cities, households who live in smaller cities may have lower
threshold prices. With regards to preference for chain restaurants, households that have a
strong preference for chain restaurants have lower threshold price compared to
households who are neutral.

Households that have a strong preference for full service restaurants over causal/quickservice have a 2% higher threshold price compared to households that are neutral about
full-service restaurants. It presupposes that households with a strong preference for
restaurants have an affinity for being waited upon, being served full-course meals and
getting satisfactory service. This probably makes their restaurant visits more pleasurable
and hence they would be willing to pay more for worthwhile services. Thus the
households with strong preference for full-service restaurants are more willing to pay for
increases in restaurant taxes. On the other hand, households that do not strongly prefer
full-service restaurants have a 4% lower threshold price compared to households that are
neutral.
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The variables for households who do and not have strong preference for restaurants that
use local foods in their menu offerings were statistically significant. This suggests that
compared to neutral households, households who do not strongly prefer restaurants that
use local foods in the menu offerings have a 4% lower threshold price. Households that
do not strongly prefer local food restaurants may be more open to other restaurant
options. More restaurant options give the households more flexibility with their restaurant
choices. The freedom to opt for other restaurants may be a contributing factor to their
lower threshold prices and may make such households less willing to pay for restaurant
tax increases. Quite unexpected, households who strongly prefer local food restaurants
have a 2% lower threshold price compared to neutral households. This may be so because
households that have a strong preference for local foods may already be paying a price
premium for their meals. Thus they may not be as willing to pay for any further cost
increases in their restaurant meals. As a result households that are neutral to local food
restaurants may have the highest threshold price and may be more willing to pay for
restaurant meal cost increases.

Case Study
Households makes purchases at restaurants out of total disposable income, thus they
cannot spend more than their total household income. In the event of an increase in the
cost of their restaurant meals, the household might reduce food expenditures to defray
costs, leave expenditures unchanged or increase expenditures to be able to afford the
same amount of utility as before. The objective of this section is to investigate which
segment of the population would be most affected by a cost increase in restaurant meals
and to recommend whether or not to impose a cost increase and how to segment it.
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If a cost increase is imposed, who would reduce their consumption and by how much?
For the purposes of this study, I examine the general case of a 5 percent cost increase in
restaurant meals. I choose a 5% increase because it’s not lower than the legislatureproposed increase in restaurant taxes and it is high enough to make room/allow for
contingencies. The data may not tell us by how much households would change their
restaurant expenditures when a cost increase is imposed but it tells us who would, say
low-income households.

Demographics - who can/cannot afford a 5% tax and where do they live? To ascertain
who would be able to afford a 5% cost increase in their restaurant meals I use 2012
estimates of county-level data from Census Bureau to estimate threshold price. I rerun the
initial regression with continuous variables in place of the categorical variables for age,
income, education and household size.
𝑇𝑃 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛼3 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + ε
Using the coefficient estimates I plug the average values into the regression equation. I
hypothesize that if the TP is lower than 5% then the tax should not be imposed. If
however the TP is greater than 5% then the tax can be imposed in that county/city. The
base line value of the TP regression was 13.09. Depending of the unique characteristics
of a county/city this value may rise or fall as an indication of its willingness to pay for a
cost increase in restaurant meals.

Oldham County is considered one of the wealthiest counties in Kentucky and has the city
of La Grange as its county seat. According to the 2012 census estimates, Oldham County
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has a 53% male population, an average of 2.9 persons per household, an average age of
39 years, $83,164 median income and an average of 20years of schooling. The city of La
Grange, with a population of 8,231 (2012 estimates) and is ranked as a 4th size city.
Plugging these demographics into the regression, the TP value for the city of Lagrange
was estimated to be 15.6. Hence all things equal, the city of La Grange would be willing
to pay for a cost increase of up to 16% in their restaurant meals. Thus a meal tax in this
city may be imposed without any significant change is the purchasing behavior of the
households.

Subsequently I consider the case of a less populous, less wealthy county. Owsley County
is the least wealthy and second-least populous county in Kentucky and has the city of
Booneville as its county seat. According to 2012 Census Bureau estimates, Owsley
County has a 52% male population, an average of 2.8 persons per household, average age
of 44 years, $19,624 median income and an average of 16 years of schooling. Now
Booneville, ranked as a 6th size- city has a population of 80 (2012 estimates). With these
demographic values, the TP for Booneville was estimated to be 11.6. Thus all things
equal, Boonville would be willing to pay for a cost increase of up to 12% in their
restaurant meals.

In general, urban cities are likely to be more willing to bear a higher cost increase in their
restaurant meals compared to rural cities. Among all the demographic variables, the
median income was the most significant determinant of the city’s TP. Nonetheless all the
counties within the Common wealth of Kentucky would be able to impose a 3%
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restaurant tax without a considerable change in restaurant frequency and meal purchasing
behavior of its residents.
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Summary & Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the level of tax that would cause Kentuckians
to either eat in restaurants less frequently or change what they typically purchase in
restaurants. The study was designed to investigate if there were significant relationships
between socio-demographic characteristics of households in Kentucky and the threshold
price of restaurant meals and also to determine the marginal effects of the significant
variables. Additionally we investigate whether restaurant characteristics (e.g. chain
restaurants or local food restaurants) also influence the threshold prices of households.
The objective was achieved using empirical Tobit models for the analysis augmented
with survey data.
Summary of Methodology
The data for the study was obtained from an online survey of households in Kentucky.
The respondents responded to various questions concerning their restaurant meal
consumption behavior including their frequency of restaurant visits and meal
consumption, average amount spent per meal and the level of increase in the total cost of
their “usual” restaurant meal that would cause them to eat less frequently in restaurants or
change what they would typically purchase. The respondents were also asked to rank
their preferences for specific restaurant attributes in two different scenarios involving no
tax or a 3% tax. Other socio-demographic characteristics including age, income level and
gender were captured in the survey.
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A Tobit model was applied to the survey data to analyze the choice of level of tax that
would influence households of different socio-demographic characteristics in Kentucky
to eat less frequently at restaurants or change what they would typically purchase. The
Tobit model enables the inclusion of both zero and non-zero responses of threshold price
in the analysis, increasing the efficiency of the estimation procedure. The Tobit model is
censored at zero from below since respondents cannot choose negative threshold prices
and censored at sixty from above in regards to the survey question which restricted the
respondents from selecting a threshold price above sixty even if they had a threshold
price greater than sixty, though not likely. The marginal effects of the Tobit model
indicate the effects of household socio-demographic characteristics and restaurant
preferences on the threshold price.
Summary of Findings
Based on the tax choke model specification, our results reveal stimulating insights about
the socio-demographic characteristics as well as restaurant preferences and food choices
that affect the level of tax that would cause households in Kentucky to eat less frequently
at restaurants or change what they would typically purchase. We find that for every
additional dinner that a household has at a restaurant, the household’s threshold price
increases by 0.2%. Households that live in higher tax rate communities and would travel
to restaurants in lower tax rate communities have a 3% lower threshold price compared to
households that would not travel to eat in the lower tax rate communities. The threshold
price for households that would vote for a restaurant tax if proceeds were used for
tourism is 2% higher than households that would not vote for the tax. Households who
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notice all taxes when paying their restaurant bills have 2% lower threshold price than
household who tend not to observe the taxes.
In comparison to households aged less than 30 years, households between the ages of 5160 have 2.9% lower threshold prices. Compared to low income households, low-middle
and middle income households have a 3% higher threshold price, middle-high income
households have a 4% higher threshold price and high income households have an 8%
higher threshold price. With reference to households that have less than a high school
diploma, households that have obtained a 2-year degree or a graduate degree have a 2%
lower threshold price. Households that strongly prefer full-service restaurants have a 2%
higher tax Threshold price than households that are neutral. Households that do not
strongly prefer restaurants that use local foods in their menu offerings have a 5% lower
threshold price than households that are neutral to local foods.
Policy Implications/Recommendations
The findings have several potential implications for stakeholders: consumers, restaurant
owners, tourism boards and the legislature alike. To effectively meet the needs of
Kentucky’s growing population, government policymakers, restaurant business owners,
marketing experts, and hospitality and tourism planners must be informed about the
consumption and/or spending patterns of consumers in response to the restaurant tax of
increases. Differing socio-demographic characteristics and fragmented market segments
of the population may result in differing expenditure and consumption patterns between
the young and old, more and less educated, the more and less rich and even males and
females.
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Cross comparisons of the different socio-demographic profiles would allow
legislation/marketing to target segments that contribute most to the bottom line. For
example households within the highest income bracket ($150,000 and above) have the
highest threshold prices, and thus their food choice/ meal consumption behavior is likely
to remain the same irrespective of whether a tax is levied or not. On the other hand
households that are headed by retirees or individuals close to retirement are negatively
affected by the tax and thus such households would be less willing to pay the tax and
adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. Thus tax/price promotions would yield a
more profitable outcome if they focus specifically on households headed by retirees for
example. The proportion of elderly in the population will continue to increase as the baby
boom generation advances in age. Expenditure patterns on FAFH by the elderly is
noteworthy for business owners, designers of food related programs, policies, goods and
services to effectively meet the needs of the elderly while taking full advantage of their
purchasing patterns.
Household income was found to be a significant and positive factor accounting for
positive variations of threshold prices. Higher income levels and/or an increase in income
levels increases the level at which an individual will change his/her choice of restaurant
or meal. The results conform to theoretical expectations. As spelled out by Cai (1998),
decomposing market into current and potential markets is significant for research practice
since by focusing narrowly on existing consumer base, there’s the possibility of forgoing
a potentially more profitable market segment. High income households do not consider
eating in restaurants as a luxury and wouldn’t change their meal selection based solely on
small percentage increase in restaurant tax. These households tend to frequent sit-down
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restaurants more often than they would fast-food joints. Because of their higher
disposable incomes, high-income households are least likely to change their purchasing
behavior as a result of even fairly large sales tax on restaurant meals. Thus the tax poses
no direct cost (or benefit) to high income households. On the other hand the results show
that lower-income households are the most likely to change their purchasing behavior in
efforts to evade/circumvent the tax.
Households’ interests in consuming local foods have increased over the years with
marketing trends proliferating ‘local’ brands and menus. We infer from our model that
households who least strongly prefer restaurants that include local foods on menu
offerings are least likely to be willing to pay for even small restaurant tax increases. Thus
promotion of menu items with local branding or identification of where the ingredients
were grown may not appeal to this segment of the population. Such households may not
be willing to pay a premium for restaurant meals even if they know that the food items
are from local sources.
Caveats
This analysis has a number of limitations. First of all, the survey was self-administered,
which may have led to under- or over-reporting. The responses and ratings by the survey
respondents were self-generated and self-reported, and as such, the observations may or
may not be representative of their true characteristics or opinions. Secondly, since the
sample group for this research was obtained from individuals with publically available
email addresses, primarily college and university websites throughout Kentucky, the
sample may be skewed towards the characteristics, views and opinions of more
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professors and persons closely associated with academic institutions. Thirdly, the mental
behavior of the respondents is unobservable and may not be entirely responsive to any
cues afforded by the survey instrument. Last but not least, the social, economic and
demographic characteristics of the sample are neither representative of the
commonwealth of Kentucky nor of the United States thus our results deduced from our
sample may not apply to the United States as a whole.

Future Studies
In subsequent studies, other econometric techniques can be exploited to validate the
consistency of the findings and extended to include other relevant variables that associate
consumers’ tax behavior to income ranges and other socio-demographic variables.
Further studies can evaluate a time series analysis and track the changes in respondent
restaurant patronizing behavior with respect to taxes over time.
A subsequent survey could elicit expenditures responses on restaurant meals for scenarios
before and after the potential tax instrument. An analysis on expenditure patterns could
provide information about how much varying income groups spend on FAFH before and
after tax; the post-tax increase in food expenditure per person per week. Also the welfare
loss to consumers and restaurant owners as well as the percent increase/decrease in
potential revenue for the state could be analyzed.
Future studies could explore the possibility of a 3% tax being low enough to leave
restaurant choice and meal selection behavior unchanged and high enough to generate
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substantial revenue. Of the revenue generated, the percent accumulated from each of the
income tiers of consumers’ expenditure/purchases could also be inferred.
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Appendix
Key survey question used for thesis:
By how much would the total cost of restaurant meals have to increase before you
would eat in restaurants less frequently or change what you typically purchase in
restaurants?
Click the line to indicate the percentage increase in cost that would lead you to eat in restaurants
less frequently or change what you typically purchase in restaurants.

(For more than 60%, select 60.)
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